The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders
The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders
复制标题
有利于长期股东的令人不安的情况
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2227080
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Fried
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Fried
本文挑战了公司法和公司治理中一个持久而普遍的观点：公司管理者应该优先考虑长期股东而不是短期股东，并最大化长期股东的回报而不是短期股价。支撑这一观点的是一种根深蒂固的直觉：随着时间的推移，采取措施增加长期股东回报将产生更大的经济蛋糕。但我认为这种直觉是有缺陷的。长期股东和短期股东一样，可以从经理人破坏价值中获益——即使公司唯一的剩余索取者是股东。事实上，服务于长期股东的管理者很可能比服务于短期股东的管理者破坏更多的价值。因此，随着时间的推移，有利于长期股东的利益可能会减少而不是增加公司创造的价值。
This paper challenges a persistent and pervasive view in corporate law and corporate governance: that a firm’s managers should favor long-term shareholders over short-term shareholders, and maximize long-term shareholders’ returns rather than the short-term stock price. Underlying this view is a strongly-held intuition that taking steps to increase long-term shareholder returns will generate a larger economic pie over time. But this intuition, I show, is flawed. Long-term shareholders, like short-term shareholders, can benefit from managers destroying value — even when the firm’s only residual claimants are its shareholders. Indeed, managers serving long-term shareholders may well destroy more value than managers serving short-term shareholders. Favoring the interests of long-term shareholders could thus reduce, rather than increase, the value generated by a firm over time.