Ownership structure and corporate governance in Latin America.
Ownership structure and corporate governance in Latin America.
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拉丁美洲的所有权结构和公司治理。
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Lefort
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Lefort
本文件概述了拉丁美洲国家的公司治理做法，调查了现有的经验文献，审查了多国组织编写的关于这一主题的报告，并提供了拉丁美洲不同经济体公司所有权和控制结构的新数据。与其他新兴经济体一样，拉丁美洲的公司治理受到所有权高度集中和大量工业和金融集团控制几家公司的制约。这种公司结构在控股股东和少数股东之间产生了代理问题，当控股股东持有与其现金流权不成比例的投票权时，这种代理问题就会加剧。新的经验证据表明，拉丁美洲市场惩罚控股股东持有的控制权和现金流量权之间的过度分离。此外，该区域的立法、条例和司法权力在促进和执行良好做法方面不如较发达市场有效。最近进行了法律的改革，以改善对少数股东的保护和执法。
This paper provides an overview of corporate governance practices in Latin American countries, surveying the available empirical literature, reviewing the reports on the subject prepared by multinational organizations, and providing new data for ownership and control structures of companies in different Latin American economies. Like in other emerging economies corporate governance in Latin America is conditioned by the high level of ownership concentration and the profusion of industrial and financial conglomerates controlling several companies. This corporate structure generates an agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders, that is exacerbated when controlling shareholders hold a disproportionate amount of voting power in relation to their cash flow rights. New empirical evidence indicates that Latin American markets penalize excessive separation between control and cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders. In addition, legislation, regulations and the judiciary power in the region are less effective in promoting and enforcing good practices than in more developed markets. Legal reform has been recently introduced to improve minority shareholder protection and enforcement.