Tax Evasion and Competition
Tax Evasion and Competition
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9485.2011.00565.x
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发表时间：
2007-09
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Goerke;M. Runkel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Goerke;M. Runkel
本文利用一个具有内生企业数量和间接逃税行为的古诺寡头垄断模型，证明了更激烈的竞争可能会产生通过增加逃税而侵蚀税收收入的负面影响。如果市场进入成本下降，情况就会是这样。如果边际生产成本下降，而需求要么是弱凹的，要么是凸且缺乏弹性的，那么类似的结果也会成立。如果(A)边际生产成本下降，需求具有凸性和弹性，或者(B)需求弹性增强，将获得更多竞争、更少规避和更高税收的理想结果。
Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, this paper shows that more intense competition may have the negative side-effect of eroding tax revenues by increasing tax evasion. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave or convex and inelastic. The desirable result of more competition, less evasion and higher tax revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases.