Endogenous timing in strategic environmental policymaking
Endogenous timing in strategic environmental policymaking
复制标题
战略环境政策制定的内生时机
DOI：
10.1007/s10640-012-9622-y
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Keisuke Hattori and Takahiro Kitamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Banri Ito;Eiichi Tomiura;Ryuhei Wakasugi;伊藤萬里;伊藤萬里;若杉隆平・伊藤萬里;Keisuke Hattori;Keisuke Hattori and Takahiro Kitamura
在本文中，我们内生化决策的时间在一个简单的两国模型的战略环境政策。我们考虑了一个时间博弈，其中两个政策制定者非合作决定他们的首选顺序的动作之前，设置排放税税率。我们发现，政策制定者是否同时或顺序实施排放税政策，关键取决于环境损害的程度。当损害不显著时，税率是战略替代品，均衡中出现了错误的决策。相反，当损害很大时，税率是战略补充，并出现顺序移动决策。我们还扩展了模型，允许不同的国家之间的环境损害的脆弱性。当差异很大时，博弈的唯一均衡是脆弱性较低的国家充当领导者的情况。在出现多重均衡的情况下，风险主导均衡也是脆弱性较低的国家主导的均衡。
In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages. When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes, and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements, and sequential-move policymaking emerges. We also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk-dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads.