The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information
The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.2021.4244
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发表时间：
2021-12-15
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Saccardo, Silvia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Golman, Russell;Loewenstein, George;Saccardo, Silvia
管理学家认识到，决策依赖于人们所拥有的信息，但缺乏关于信息需求(和避免)的统一行为理论。在现有的理论框架中，效用取决于信念和对它们的关注，我们开发和测试了一个关于信息需求的理论，该理论包含了工具性的考虑、好奇心和将注意力引导到一个人感觉良好的信念上的愿望。我们将个体对信息的需求分解为提炼信念的愿望，保持注意力不变，以及将注意力集中在预期信念上的愿望，保持这些信念不变。因为解决不确定性(即提炼信念)的效用取决于人们对它的关注，而更重要或更突出的问题会吸引更多的关注，因此对信息的需求取决于它所涉及的问题(S)的重要性和突出度。此外，由于获取新信息的注意力集中在一个人的信念上，人们希望品尝好消息而忽略坏消息，因此获取或避免信息的愿望取决于预期信念的价位(即，好或坏)。五个实验(n=2,361)测试并找到了对这些假设的支持，观察了中性的价态信息以及与自我相关的信息。人们确实更倾向于获取信息：(A)当信息感觉更重要时，即使它不能帮助决策(实验1A和2A)；(B)当问题更突出时，通过时间滞后来操纵(实验1B和2B)；以及(C)当预期信念具有更高的价态时(实验2C)。
Management scientists recognize that decision making depends on the information people have but lack a unified behavioral theory of the demand for (and avoidance of) information. Drawing on an existing theoretical framework in which utility depends on beliefs and the attention paid to them, we develop and test a theory of the demand for information encompassing instrumental considerations, curiosity, and desire to direct attention to beliefs one feels good about. We decompose an individual's demand for information into the desire to refine beliefs, holding attention constant, and the desire to focus attention on anticipated beliefs, holding these beliefs constant. Because the utility of resolving uncertainty (i.e., refining beliefs) depends on the attention paid to it and more important or salient questions capture more attention, demand for information depends on the importance and salience of the question(s) it addresses. In addition, because getting new information focuses attention on one's beliefs and people want to savor good news and ignore bad news, the desire to obtain or avoid information depends on the valence (i.e., goodness or badness) of anticipated beliefs. Five experiments (n = 2,361) test and find support for these hypotheses, looking at neutrally valenced as well as ego-relevant information. People are indeed more inclined to acquire information (a) when it feels more important, even if it cannot aid decision making (Experiments 1A and 2A); (b) when a question is more salient, manipulated through time lag (Experiments 1B and 2B); and (c) when anticipated beliefs have higher valence (Experiment 2C).