Proscribing Peace: How Listing Armed Groups as Terrorists Hurts Negotiations
Proscribing Peace: How Listing Armed Groups as Terrorists Hurts Negotiations
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禁止和平：将武装团体列为恐怖分子如何损害谈判
DOI：
10.1080/13698249.2022.2107787
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Maria Amjad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Maria Amjad
《恐怖分子损害谈判》揭示了国际制裁对谈判的影响，特别是它如何影响未来和平谈判的前景。该书将国际制裁定义为将武装团体指定为恐怖组织的行为。联合国安理会第 1373 号决议的通过和 2001 年 9 月 11 日的事件在国际体系中纳入了对非国家武装团体的禁令。然而，在许多情况下，政府随后与武装团体进行谈判。哈斯佩斯拉格强调了各国政府同时采取的截然不同的行为，将武装团体标记为恐怖分子并与他们进行谈判，特别是在哥伦比亚的情况下，哈斯佩斯拉格试图回答这个问题：禁令如何影响和平谈判的开始？这些发现为关于和平谈判、安全化以及批判恐怖主义研究和反恐政策制定的既定领域的新兴文献做出了贡献。该书提出了一个由两部分组成的框架：首先，它认为禁令对冲突双方都具有象征性和物质性的影响。一方面，禁令将武装团体定性为暴力和非法组织；另一方面，它暗示国家是合法的行为体，值得国内和国际支持打击“恐怖分子”。这些象征意义具有物质影响，增强了国家对抗其反对派武装团体的力量。该框架的第二部分讨论了不同参与者之间的动态以及冲突各方到达谈判桌的过程。在本节中，该书令人信服地指出，将旷日持久的武装冲突定性为针对恐怖分子的战争的行为从根本上通过推迟冲突解决来影响冲突动态。一个重大贡献是“语言停火”的想法，这是国家必须采取的必要步骤，以丑化武装团体并允许进行和平谈判。语言停火是“政府开始解除武装并降低以公共方式描述对手的语言的过程”（第 58 页）。虽然去丑化规定需要将被禁止的恶棍带回日常政治领域，但如果在谈判之前不可能将这些团体实际除名（将团体或实体的名称从指定恐怖分子的国际名单中删除），则语言停火就会发生。为了降低国内公民和国际社会的观众成本，各国政府有意识地改变语言，以改变对武装团体的看法。哈斯佩斯拉强调，这种通过语言进行的去丑化
Terrorists Hurts Negotiations’, sheds light on the effects of international proscription on negotiations, in particular, how it impacts prospects for future peace negotiations. The book defines the international proscription as the act of designating armed groups as terrorist organisations. The passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and the events of 11 September 2001 embedded proscription against non-state armed groups in the international system. However, in many cases, governments subsequently negotiated with armed groups. Highlighting governments’ concurrent contrasting acts to label armed groups as terrorists and negotiate with them, especially in the case of Colombia, Haspeslagh seeks to answer the question: how has proscription affected the inception of peace negotiations? The findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on peace negotiations, securitisation, and established fields of critical terrorism studies and counterterrorism policymaking. The book sets out a two-part framework: first, it argues that proscription has symbolic and material ramifications for both the main parties of the conflict. On the one hand, proscription frames armed groups as violent and illegitimate; on the other hand, it insinuates that the state is a legitimate actor worthy of domestic and international support against ‘terrorists’. These symbolic implications have material effects, bolstering the power of the state vis-à-vis its opposition–the armed group. The second part of the framework discusses dynamics between the different actors and the processes through which conflict parties arrive at the negotiation table. In this section, the book cogently argues that the act of framing protracted armed conflicts as wars against terrorists fundamentally affects conflict dynamics by delaying conflict resolution. A significant contribution is the idea of ‘linguistic ceasefire’as a necessary step state must take to de-vilify an armed groups and allow for peace negotiations to take place. The linguistic ceasefire is a ‘process through which the government starts disarming and de-escalating the language used to describe its opponent in a public fashion’(p. 58). While de-vilification stipulates the need to bring the proscribed villain back into the realm of everyday politics, a linguistic ceasefire occurs when the actual de-listing (taking the name of the group or entity out of the international list of designated terrorists) of the groups is not possible ahead of negotiations. To mitigate audience costs from domestic citizenry and the international community, governments consciously shift their language to change perceptions of armed groups. Haspeslagh highlights that such de-vilification via linguistic