Multi-level Coalitions and Statute Reform in Spain

Multi-level Coalitions and Statute Reform in Spain
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西班牙的多层次联盟和法规改革

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发表时间:
2009
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通讯作者:
Alex Wilson
Alex Wilson
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作者:
A. Orte;Alex Wilson

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2003年至2007年期间,西班牙对六个区域自治法规进行了改革。这些组织法是西班牙“宪法集团”的一部分,决定了国家权力下放的特点,因此包含了在地区和西班牙议会进行修订的高门槛。在西班牙,法规是“非制度化联邦制”的一个灵活组成部分,其谈判突出了国家设计中的向心力和离心力。现有的实证研究对这些改革的内容进行了比较。本文比较了法规改革的政治动力,根据现有的文献联盟讨价还价。它认为,法规改革是一个竞争性的两个层次的游戏(区域和中央),这需要各方形成单一问题的“法规联盟”。法规联盟需要不同程度的政党间合作,并可能扭曲全州和非全州政党之间更持久的执政或议会联盟。它们可能加剧党内紧张关系,但也可能有助于多层次舞台上的“联盟实验”。法规谈判是无限制的,因为西班牙政党利用它们来获得选举优势,而不仅仅是为了确保他们的政策偏好。本文包含两个法规改革的案例研究(加泰罗尼亚、瓦伦西亚),说明了这些复杂而多样的动态,并为进一步研究多层次体系中的宪法改革提出了比较途径。
Between 2003 and 2007 six regional statutes of autonomy were reformed in Spain. These are Organic Laws that form part of the ‘constitutional bloc’ in Spain and determine the characteristics of state decentralization, so contain high thresholds for revision in the regional and Spanish parliament. Statutes are a flexible component of ‘non-institutional federalism’ in Spain and their negotiation highlights both centripetal and centrifugal dynamics in state design. Existing empirical studies have compared the content of these reforms. This article compares the political dynamics of statute reform, in light of existing literature on coalitional bargaining. It argues that statute reform is a competitive two-level game (regional and central), which requires parties to form single-issue ‘statute coalitions’. Statute coalitions require varying degrees of inter-party co-operation, and can distort more permanent governing or parliamentary coalitions between statewide and non-statewide parties. They can exacerbate intra-party tensions, but may also be useful for ‘coalitional experimentation’ in multi-level arenas. Statute negotiations are unbounded because Spanish parties exploit them for electoral advantage and not merely to secure their policy preferences. This article contains two case studies of statute reform (Catalonia, Valencia) which illustrate these complex and varied dynamics, and suggests comparative avenues for further research on constitutional reform in multi-level systems.