Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
复制标题
非理想理论中的道德要求
DOI：
10.1215/00318108-110-4-614
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Murphy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Murphy
道德的合理要求是否存在限度？特别是，人们直接或通过社会制度促进他人福祉的责任是否存在限度？功利主义不承认这种限度，因此常常被认为是一种在道德和政治观点上要求过高、令人无法接受的理论。在这项全新的原创研究中，墨菲认为，对过高要求的指责只不过是对现状的一种肯定。功利主义的真正问题在于，在我们这个并非人人都理想地遵守道德的世界里，它对遵守道德的人提出了不公平的要求。墨菲表明，在对我们促进他人福祉的责任进行集体理解的情况下，这种不公平就不会出现。因此，墨菲认为，虽然道德要求的程度一般来说不存在问题，但迫切需要承认仁爱要求的集体性质。
Is there a limit to the legitimate demands of morality? In particular, is there a limit to people's responsibility to promote the well-being of others, either directly or via social institutions? Utilitarianism admits no such limit, and is for that reason often said to be an unacceptably demanding moral and political view. In this original new study, Murphy argues that the charge of excessive demands amounts to little more than an affirmation of the status quo. The real problem with utilitarianism is that it makes unfair demands on people who comply with it in our world of nonideal compliance. Murphy shows that this unfairness does not arise on a collective understanding of our responsibility for others' well being. Thus, according to Murphy, while there is no general problem to be raised about the extent of moral demands, there is a pressing need to acknowledge the collective nature of the demands of beneficence.