Optimal privatization policy with Bertrand competition
Optimal privatization policy with Bertrand competition
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具有 Bertrand 竞争的最优私有化政策
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2017.12.008
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Jiunn‐Rong Chiou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chia;Jiunn‐Rong Chiou
本文将混合寡头垄断市场中效率较低的公共企业与私营企业进行价格竞争的私有化程度内生化。结果与数量竞争情况下的结果有很大的不同。首先，上市公司的价格可能低于或高于私人公司的价格。第二，私有化不一定会提高两家公司的价格。最后，最优私有化程度与上市公司效率之间的关系是非单调的。因此，在价格竞争的情况下，最优的私有化政策并不总是部分私有化，它也可能是完全私有化或完全国有化。
This article endogenizes the degree of privatization under a mixed oligopoly market in which a less efficient public firm engages in price competition with a private firm. The results are substantially different from those obtained in quantity competition situations. First, the public firm's price may be lower or higher than the private firm's price. Second, privatization should not necessarily increase both firms' prices. Finally, the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the efficiency of the public firm is nonmonotonic. Hence, the optimal privatization policy in price competition situation is not always partial privatization; it might also be full privatization or full nationalization.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
K. Fujiwara
通讯作者：
K. Fujiwara