The Authority Account of Prudential Options
The Authority Account of Prudential Options
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审慎期权的权威账户
DOI：
10.1111/sjp.12094
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
K. Horton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Horton
权威账户提供了为什么常识道德包含审慎选择的新解释——从道德角度来看，这些选择允许代理人采取有利于自身福祉的行动，而不是他们最有理由采取的行动。该解释的核心是两个主张。首先，道德要求传统上被广泛认为具有权威地位；也就是说，是道德（或更具体地说，代表道德行事的某个合适的代理人或机构）通过权利强加的规则。第二，为了使道德要求具有这样的地位，道德必须包含审慎的选择。如果这两种说法都是正确的，那么它们就会产生一种（理性）压力，要求人们认为道德包含审慎的选择。根据权威的说法，常识道德包含这样的选择这一事实（至少在很大程度上）是这种压力的结果。
The Authority Account provides a new explanation why commonsense morality contains prudential options—options that permit agents to perform actions that promote their own wellbeing more than the action they have most reason to do, from the moral point of view. At the core of that explanation are two claims. The first is that moral requirements are traditionally widely taken to have an authoritative status; that is, to be rules that morality (or more specifically some suitable agent or agency, acting on behalf of morality) imposes by right. The second is that in order for moral requirements to have such a status, morality must contain prudential options. If both of these claims are true, then they will create a (rational) pressure to think of morality as containing prudential options. And according to the Authority Account, the fact that commonsense morality contains such options is (at least in significant part) the result of this pressure.