Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism
Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism
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摇摆州、赢家通吃的选举团和财政联邦制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Cebula
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Christopher M. Duquette;F. Mixon;R. Cebula
选举团制度对美国总统选举的影响经常受到学者和政治评论家的批评。其影响的一方面是各州选举团选票的赢家通吃分配，实际上导致某些州的某些选票相对于其他州的其他选票偏重。总统选举中选票相对影响力的差异可能很大。在这里，引入了一个指标来量化每次总统选举中这些差异的程度。使用该指标，我们发现在总统选举中选票过多的州随后在新当选（连任）的政府领导下获得了更高水平的联邦拨款支出。
The impact of the Electoral College on U.S. presidential elections is often criticized by academics and political commentators. One facet of its impact, the winner-take-all allocation of states’ Electoral College votes, serves in practice to overweight some votes in some states relative to other votes in other states. These disparities in the relative impact of votes in a presidential election can be large. Here, a metric is introduced to quantify the magnitude of these disparities in each presidential election. Using that metric, we show that states whose votes were overweighted in a presidential election subsequently received higher levels of federal grant spending under the newly-elected (re-elected) administration.