How to Manipulate Social Media: Analyzing Political Astroturfing Using Ground Truth Data from South Korea
How to Manipulate Social Media: Analyzing Political Astroturfing Using Ground Truth Data from South Korea
复制标题
如何操纵社交媒体：使用韩国的地面实况数据分析政治 Astroturfing
DOI：
10.1609/icwsm.v11i1.14941
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
JungHwan Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Keller;David Schoch;Sebastian Stier;JungHwan Yang
该项目调查政治 astroturfing，即强大的政治行为者旨在模仿社交媒体上的草根活动的隐藏宣传。我们重点关注韩国特勤局用来影响 2012 年总统选举以支持最终获胜者朴槿惠的 Twitter 帐户。基于 Twitter 帐户活动模式和推文文本特征的两个独立聚类分析可靠地表明，存在三组 NIS 帐户，其中一组主要从事转发，另一组专注于发布带有链接的新闻文章。我们表明，这些团体反映了不同的战略议程，并与法庭文件中确定的几名特勤人员相对应。我们认为，这些协调推文的模式与委托代理理论的预测一致，因此也应该出现在其他 astroturfing 活动中。
This project investigates political astroturfing, that is, hidden propaganda by powerful political actors aimed at mimicking grassroots activity, on social media. We focus on Twitter accounts used by the South Korean secret service to influence the 2012 presidential elections in favor of the eventual winner, Park Geun-hye. Two independent cluster analyses based on activity patterns of the Twitter accounts and textual features of tweets reliably reveal that there are three groups of NIS accounts, including one group that engages mostly in retweeting, and another group focused on posting news articles with a link. We show that these groups reflect different strategic agendas and correspond to several secret service agents identified in the court documents. We argue that these patterns of coordinated tweeting are consistent with predictions derived from principal-agent theory, and should therefore appear in other astroturfing campaigns as well.