China's export registration in the automobile industry: Effects on manufacturer-intermediary match efficiency
China's export registration in the automobile industry: Effects on manufacturer-intermediary match efficiency
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发表时间：
2019-03
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通讯作者：
Xiaonan Sun
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作者：
Xiaonan Sun
2007年，中国实施了一项政策，要求汽车生产商通过最多三个贸易中介进行分销，并将其中介列入登记册。本文基于汽车制造商与中介机构之间的市场匹配关系，从汽车制造商与中介机构之间的市场匹配关系出发，分析了汽车制造商与中介机构之间的市场匹配关系。它造成匹配效率低下和双重边缘化。模型的预测与一些程式化的事实相吻合：汽车中介数量的大幅下降，强制性匹配，中介的出口价格上涨，以及汽车制造商注册的中介机构的大量流失。从总利润角度进行的福利分析表明，这一规定有利于汽车制造商，特别是那些效率相对较低的汽车制造商，而中间商的情况则更糟。
In 2007, China implemented a policy requiring automobile producers to distribute through at most three trade intermediaries and list their intermediaries on a registry. Motivated by the registration requirements and granularity in the order sizes handled by most intermediaries, this paper develops a model to describe the matches between automakers and intermediaries.The model shows market division arises endogenously due to the regulation. It creates inefficiencies in matching and double marginalization. The model predictions coincide with a number of stylized facts: a strong decline in the number of auto intermediaries, assortative matching, export price increases for intermediaries, and substantial churning in the sets of intermediaries registered by the automakers. Welfare analysis in terms of total profit shows that this regulation benefits automakers, especially those relatively less efficient ones while intermediaries are made worse off.