Agricultural Supply Chains under Government Interventions

Agricultural Supply Chains under Government Interventions
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发表时间:
2016
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通讯作者:
Duygu Akkaya;Kostas Bimpikis;Hau L. Lee
Duygu Akkaya;Kostas Bimpikis;Hau L. Lee
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其他
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作者:
Duygu Akkaya;Kostas Bimpikis;Hau L. Lee

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农业部门,特别是发展中经济体的农业部门,受到可能对农民的产量和实际收入产生不利影响的不确定因素的影响。政府的支持通常用于确保农民的稳定收入和农产品的可靠供应。我们研究了一个区域市场,其中农民人口服从随机产量,为连续的消费者服务。我们考察了价格支持、成本支持和增产措施这三种干预措施的有效性,以及公布总预算或单位支持等不同的政策实施方式对农民收入、消费者剩余和政府支出回报的影响。结果表明,当总预算为公开信息时,价格支持干预和成本支持干预是等价的。另一方面,如果政府宣布单位支持,农业供应链上不同利益相关者的利益取决于干预造成的市场扭曲程度。具体来说,在这种情况下,价格支持导致更大的扭曲,消费者比成本支持更受益,而农民则相反。此外,我们发现,在提高产量的努力下,由于几种市场和作物特性的相互作用,农民可能会遭受损失。最后,我们证明从政府的角度来看,干预并不总是产生正回报。
The agricultural sector, especially in developing economies, is subject to uncertainties that may adversely affect farmers’ yields and realized incomes. Government support is often used to ensure steady incomes for the farmers and a reliable supply of agricultural commodities. We study a regional market with a population of farmers subject to random yield serving a continuum of consumers. We investigate the effectiveness of three types of interventions, price support, cost support, and yield enhancement efforts, as well as different policy implementation methods such as announcing the total budget or the unit support, in terms of their impact on farmers’ incomes, consumer surplus, and return on government spending. It is shown that price and cost support interventions are equivalent if the total budget is public information. On the other hand, if the government announces the unit support, the benefit to different stakeholders along the agricultural supply chain depends on the market distortion created by the intervention. Specifically, in this case, price support results in greater distortion, benefiting consumers more than cost support whereas the converse holds for farmers. Furthermore, we find that under yield enhancing efforts, farmers may incur losses due to the interplay of several market and crop characteristics. Lastly, we show that interventions cannot always generate positive return from the government’s perspective.