Information design for Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication
Information design for Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication
复制标题
车对车通信的信息设计
DOI：
10.1016/j.trc.2023.104084
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brown, Philip N.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gould, Brendan T.;Brown, Philip N.
新兴的车对车（V2V）通信技术通过允许车辆自动警告彼此的道路危险，有望提高道路安全。然而，对其他交通信息系统的研究表明，只向一部分驾驶员通报道路状况可能会产生增加拥堵的不利影响。在V2V危险信息共享的简单（但新颖）模型的背景下，我们问部分采用这种技术是否会同样导致不良结果。在我们的模型中，驾驶员根据从其他支持V2V的汽车接收到的信息单独选择鲁莽行为的程度，由此产生的聚合行为影响事故的可能性（从而影响车辆网络传播的信息）。我们充分利用我们的新的均衡概念，这个模型的博弈论均衡的特征。我们的模型表明，在很宽的参数空间范围内，V2V信息共享令人惊讶地增加了均衡的事故频率相对于没有V2V信息共享，它可能会增加均衡的社会成本以及。
The emerging technology of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication over vehicularad hocnetworks promises to improve road safety by allowing vehicles to autonomously warn each other of road hazards. However, research on other transportation information systems has shown that informing only a subset of drivers of road conditions may have a perverse effect of increasing congestion. In the context of a simple (yet novel) model of V2V hazard information sharing, we ask whether partial adoption of this technology can similarly lead to undesirable outcomes. In our model, drivers individually choose how recklessly to behave as a function of information received from other V2V-enabled cars, and the resulting aggregate behavior influences the likelihood of accidents (and thus the information propagated by the vehicular network). We fully characterize the game-theoretic equilibria of this model using our new equilibrium concept. Our model indicates that for a wide range of the parameter space, V2V information sharing surprisingly increases the equilibrium frequency of accidents relative to no V2V information sharing, and that it may increase equilibrium social cost as well.