Cascade versus Mechanism: The Diversity of Causal Structure in Science
Cascade versus Mechanism: The Diversity of Causal Structure in Science
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DOI：
10.1086/723623
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发表时间：
2022-12
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lauren N. Ross
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文献类型：
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作者：
Lauren N. Ross
根据主流哲学观点，生物学和神经科学中的因果解释是机械论的。由于“机制”这个术语在这些fi领域中经常被使用，难怪哲学家们认为科学地解释fic很重要。令人惊讶的是，他们认为这是唯一重要的因果术语。本文对一个新的因果概念进行了分析，它考察了科学中的级联概念及其所指的因果结构。我认为，这一概念与机制的概念有很大的不同，这种差异对我们理解科学上的因果关系和解释很重要。本文分析了科学中的级联概念及其所指的因果结构。2我考察了这种因果结构的主要特征，与之相关的类比，以及研究它所使用的策略。虽然Sciencefic Work支持区分级联和机制概念，但这种分析不仅仅是描述性的。相反，它为如何理解这些概念提供了一个理论框架。这个框架对我们评估世界的因果结构很重要，我们如何研究这种结构，如何利用它来产生特定的结果，以及如何与他人交流。在继续进行此分析之前，请按顺序排列两个clari型fi阳离子。首先，我并不建议科学家总是按照这一分析中指出的不同方式使用这些因果术语，但他们经常这样做，也应该这样使用它们。这揭示了这项工作的规范性特征，以及哲学可以为科学做出贡献的一个重要方式，即就如何理解和使用这些概念提出建议。其次，我对这些概念的分析阐明了它们的清晰方式，但为科学中的一些结构留下了边缘的空间。这种情况的存在不应阻止我们阐明在大多数情况下区分因果结构的有用类别，即使区别可能(在极少数情况下)是模糊的。
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term “mechanism” gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation. What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance. This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept–it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. I argue that this concept is importantly different from the notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science. This paper provides an analysis of the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. 2 I examine the main features of this causal structure, analogies it is associated with, and strategies used to study it. While scientific work supports distinguishing the cascade and mechanism concepts, this analysis is not merely descriptive. Instead, it provides a theoretical framework for how these concepts should be understood. This framework matters for our assessment of the causal structure of the world, how we study this structure, use it to produce particular outcomes, and communicate about it to others. Before proceeding with this analysis, two clarifications are in order. First, I do not suggest that scientists always use these causal terms in the distinct ways indicated in this analysis, but that they often do and should use them in this way. This reveals normative features of this work and an important way that philosophy can contribute to science, namely, by making suggestions for how these concepts should be understood and used. Second, my analysis of these concepts articulates clear ways in which they differ, but leaves space for some structures in science to be borderline. The presence of such cases should not prevent us from articulating useful categories that distinguish causal structures in the majority of cases, even if the distinction can (in rare cases) be blurred.