The Rationality Paradox of Nudge: Rational Tools of Government in a World of Bounded Rationality
The Rationality Paradox of Nudge: Rational Tools of Government in a World of Bounded Rationality
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DOI：
10.1111/lapo.12056
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发表时间：
2016-07-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Wegrich, Kai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lodge, Martin;Wegrich, Kai
轻推和更广泛的行为经济学方法在当代政治和政策话语中越来越占主导地位。虽然对助推的吸引力和批评（如自由家长制）给予了很多关注，但本文认为，助推是基于理性悖论的，因为它代表了一种方法，尽管它强调有限理性，但并未反映其自身对理性的限制。本文通过考虑影响政府决策的机制和在政策干预的背景下导致意外后果的机制来考虑这一悖论的含义。
Nudge and the wider behavioral economics approach has become increasingly dominant in contemporary political and policy discourse. While much attention has been paid to the attractions and criticisms of nudge (such as liberal paternalism), this article argues that nudge is based on a rationality paradox in that it represents an approach that despite its emphasis on bounded rationality, does not reflect on its own limits to rationality. The article considers the implications of this paradox by considering mechanisms that influence government decision making and mechanisms that lead to unintended consequences in the context of policy interventions.