How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
复制标题
销售多种商品的简单机制有多好
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Nisan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Hart;N. Nisan
最大化销售两种商品（或物品）的收入是一个众所周知的难题，与单一商品的情况形成鲜明对比。我们证明，当两种商品的估值独立且同分布时，简单的“一维”机制（例如分别销售两种商品）可以保证至少 73% 的最优收入，而当两种商品的估值独立时，至少可以保证 50%。然而，在估值可能相关的一般情况下，简单的机制不能保证最优收入的任何正部分。我们还引入了机制的“复杂性衡量标准”——菜单大小——并表明它自然与可以保证的最优收入的比例相关。
Maximizing the revenue from selling two goods (or items) is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the single-good case. We show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as selling the two goods separately, guarantee at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least 50% when they are independent. However, in the general case where the valuations may be correlated, simple mechanisms cannot guarantee any positive fraction of the optimal revenue. We also introduce a "measure of complexity" for mechanisms---the menu size---and show that it is naturally related to the fraction of the optimal revenue that can be guaranteed.