Russian Economic Growth in Global Perspective
Russian Economic Growth in Global Perspective
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全球视野下的俄罗斯经济增长
DOI：
10.1353/kri.2016.0001
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Alessandro Stanziani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alessandro Stanziani
尤尔根·奥斯特汉梅尔：《世界的变革：十九世纪的全球历史》。帕特里克·卡米勒翻译。X+1167 pp.新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2014。ISBN-13978-0691147451。39.95美元。《联系、纠缠和世界视角》这本书是一本畅销书，它在德国取得了令人眼花缭乱的成功，甚至在非专业读者中也是如此，随后它被翻译成了许多其他语言。它的成功是当之无愧的，因为它确实是出类拔萃的，因为它包含了丰富的材料；它复杂而微妙的论点；以及它审查的方面、问题和视角的数量。奥斯特汉梅尔对知识和技能的渴望似乎永无止境。从方法论的第一章开始，作者就展示了出色的能力和智力技巧。从这个角度来看，我们只能称赞这本书的成功，证实了克里斯托弗·贝利和约翰·达尔文等其他全球历史的成功。(1)所有这些作品都有一个共同的目标：分散历史，排除以欧洲为中心的观点--以及在奥斯特汉梅尔的案例中，基于预先定义的模型和理论的历史。他们的目标是埃里克·霍布斯鲍姆和他对革命和从封建主义向资本主义的转变构成基石的历史的马克思主义总结。(2)根据霍布斯鲍姆的观点，从“封建主义”到“资本主义”的转变经历了革命时代，然后是资本时代，最后是帝国主义时代，就像传统的马克思主义分期一样。这种史学的问题在于，在17世纪和19世纪初以及“革命时代”，连续性似乎同样重要。最后但并非最不重要的一点是，这种方法被认为是以欧洲为中心的，因为它让英国在世界历史上占据主导地位，并忘记了亚洲和非洲的重要变革，正如桑贾伊·萨勃拉赫曼扬和其他人在应对革命时代的全球方法中所展示的那样。(3)出于这个原因，这些全球历史与伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦的方法同样相去甚远，后者也是决定论的，尽管他批评资本主义，但绝对是欧洲中心主义。(4)许多历史学家--弗雷德里克·库珀(Frederick Cooper)--强调了世界体系理论的过度决定论，它根本没有为印度、亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲提供任何中介。(5)俄罗斯也是如此。沃勒斯坦的一个著名论点表明，西方资本主义的扩张是俄罗斯第二次农奴制的原因：欧洲对小麦的需求增加，促使俄罗斯领主强迫农民生产出口所需的小麦。在一般历史文献中，据说这导致了国际分工：英国使用雇佣劳动力生产纺织品，而俄罗斯通过农奴制出售粮食。(6)事实上，农奴制是从16世纪开始逐步引入的，正如我们所知，18世纪俄罗斯的经济动态不能用农奴制随着欧洲的增长而增加来解释，相反，可以用放松对农民的劳动力限制来解释，他们与贵族地主一起逐渐融入贸易网络。(7)这些动态超越了管理农奴制的官方规则，后者越来越多地被社会和经济变化所取代。要证实俄罗斯对西方的依赖即使不是更难，也是很难的，就像印度或殖民时期的非洲一样。决定论和历史决定论使我们看不到特定于俄罗斯语境的时间动态。与此同时，重要的是要将这些新的综合方法与其他方法区分开来，例如经济历史学家参与关于“大分歧”的辩论的方法。肯尼斯·波梅兰兹用适用于欧洲的相同标准解释了中国的增长势头：快速的人口发展，私有财产的保护，以及充满活力的贸易和原型工业化。…
Jurgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century. Translated by Patrick Camiller. x + 1167 pp. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. ISBN-13 978-0691147451. $39.95. Connections, Entanglements, and World Perspectives Here we have a bestselling global history, which was a dazzling success in Germany, even among nonspecialized readers, and subsequently translated into many other languages. Its success is well deserved, for it is truly exceptional in the wealth of materials it contains; its complex, subtle arguments; and the number of aspects, issues, and perspectives it examines. There seems to be no end to Osterhammel's appetite for knowledge or his skill. From the very first chapters on methodology, the author demonstrates an outstanding degree of competence and intellectual finesse. From this perspective, we can only applaud the book's success, confirming that of other global histories such as those of Christopher Bayly and John Darwin. (1) All these works share one and the same aim: to decentralize history and rule out a Europe-centered view--as well as, in Osterhammels case, histories based on predefined models and theories. They are targeting Eric Hobsbawm and his Marxist summaries of a history in which revolution and the shift from feudalism to capitalism form the keystones. (2) According to Hobsbawm, the transition from "feudalism" to "capitalism" passes through the age of revolutions, then capital, and last imperialism, as in conventional Marxist periodization. The problem with this historiography is that continuities seem equally important between the 17th and the early 19th centuries and in the "age of revolutions." Last but not least, this approach has been qualified as Eurocentric insofar as it gives Britain the leading role in world history and forgets the important transformations of Asia and Africa, as Sanjay Subrahmanyam and others have shown in their global approach to the age of revolution. (3) For this reason, these global histories are equally far removed from Immanuel Wallerstein's approach, which is also determinist and, despite his criticism of capitalism, absolutely Eurocentric. (4) Many historians--Frederick Cooper, for one--have stressed the overdeterminism of world-system theory, which provides no agency at all to India, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (5) This is also true for Russia. One well-known argument of Wallerstein's consisted in showing that the expansion of Western capitalism was the cause of the second serfdom in Russia: increased demand for wheat in Europe prompted Russian lords to coerce peasants into producing the amount of wheat required for export. In the general historical literature, this was said to have resulted in an international division of labor: England produced textiles using wage labor, whereas Russia sold grain by resorting to serfdom. (6) Indeed, serfdom had been progressively introduced since the 16th century and, as we know, the economic dynamics of 18th-century Russia cannot be explained by an increase in serfdom in response to European growth but, on the contrary, by a relaxation of the labor constraints weighing on peasants and their gradual integration, together with noble landowners, in trade networks. (7) These dynamics went beyond the official rules governing serfdom, which were increasingly overtaken by social and economic changes. It is just as hard if not harder to find confirmation of Russia's dependence on the West as it is in the case of India or colonial Africa. Finalism and historical determinism keep us from seeing the temporal dynamics specific to the Russian context. At the same time, it is important to distinguish these new syntheses from other approaches such as those of economic historians taking part in the debate on the "great divergence." Kenneth Pomeranz explained Chinese momentum using the same criteria applied to Europe: rapid demographic development, protection of private property, and dynamic trade and proto-industrialization. …