Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas.
Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas.
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社会困境中从众的演变
DOI：
10.1371/journal.pone.0137435
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Zhang B
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dong Y;Li C;Tao Y;Zhang B
在基于囚徒困境(PD)博弈和公共产品博弈(PGG)的博弈实验中，人们经常偏离自己的纳什均衡策略，而有条件的合作或从众则得到了这些实验数据的支持。在一个没有明显的“主导”策略的复杂环境中，选择团队中其他参与者的平均策略的循规蹈矩者可以通过保证他们的收入接近群体平均水平来规避风险。本文研究了重复PD博弈和重复m人PGG博弈，其中个体的策略被限制在从策略集上。我们通过两个参数来定义符合策略，即博弈中的初始动作和其他参与者在上一轮中的选择的影响。我们特别感兴趣的是针锋相对的策略，这是理论和实证研究中众所周知的顺应策略。在PD博弈和PGG博弈中，当期望回合数超过某一临界值时，TFT都可以防止非合作策略的入侵。适应性动力学的稳定性分析表明，从众总体上促进了合作的演化，并且可以通过类似于TFT的策略在ALD群体中建立合作机制。这些结果为社会两难博弈中合作的出现提供了洞察。
People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and the public goods game (PGG), whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious “dominant” strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals’ strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players’ choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games.