SmokeBomb: effective mitigation against cache side-channel attacks on the ARM architecture
SmokeBomb: effective mitigation against cache side-channel attacks on the ARM architecture
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DOI：
10.1145/3386901.3388888
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发表时间：
2020-06
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通讯作者：
Haehyun Cho;Jinbum Park;Donguk Kim;Ziming Zhao;Yan Shoshitaishvili;Adam Doupé;Gail-Joon Ahn
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作者：
Haehyun Cho;Jinbum Park;Donguk Kim;Ziming Zhao;Yan Shoshitaishvili;Adam Doupé;Gail-Joon Ahn
缓存侧通道攻击滥用旨在优化内存访问的微体系结构设计来推断有关受害者进程的信息，威胁数据隐私和安全。最近，ARM架构以其在市场上前所未有的增长，成为缓存侧通道攻击的焦点。我们提出了SmokeBomb，一种新的缓存侧通道缓解，其功能是显式地确保每个进程有一个私有空间来安全地访问敏感数据。其核心思想是将CPU核心的一级缓存用作私有空间，通过该空间，SmokeBomb可以针对对敏感数据的缓存攻击提供一致的结果，从而使攻击者无法区分受害者使用的特定数据。实验结果表明，SmokeBomb能够有效地阻止当前形式化的缓存攻击方法。
Cache side-channel attacks abuse microarchitectural designs meant to optimize memory access to infer information about victim processes, threatening data privacy and security. Recently, the ARM architecture has come into the spotlight of cache side-channel attacks with its unprecedented growth in the market. We propose SmokeBomb, a novel cache side-channel mitigation that functions by explicitly ensuring a private space for each process to safely access sensitive data. The heart of the idea is to use the L1 cache of the CPU core as a private space by which SmokeBomb can give consistent results against cache attacks on the sensitive data, and thus, an attacker cannot distinguish specific data used by the victim. Our experimental results show that SmokeBomb can effectively prevent currently formalized cache attack methods.