How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?
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道德分歧如何成为现实主义的问题？
DOI：
10.1007/s10892-008-9041-z
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Enoch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Enoch
道德分歧被广泛认为是对元伦理现实主义和客观性的威胁。在这篇文章中，我试图理解为什么道德分歧会给元伦理实在论带来一个问题。为了做到这一点，我从不同的观点中经过了几个不同的(尽管经常是相关的)论点，仔细地区分它们，并批判性地评估它们的优点。我的结论相当令人怀疑：我讨论的一些论点显然失败了。其他人对现实主义提出了挑战，但我们没有任何理由相信现实主义无法成功解决。有些人对道德现实主义者提出了质疑，还有一些人对现实主义提出了严重的反对意见，但当仔细陈述时，这些问题可以被认为本质上与道德分歧无关。我的结论是，基于道德分歧本身的论点几乎没有反对道德现实主义的份量。
Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. My conclusions are rather skeptical: Some of the arguments I discuss fail rather clearly. Others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully. Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism.