A SIMPLE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE SCHEME FOR ATTAINING
A SIMPLE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE SCHEME FOR ATTAINING
复制标题
一个简单的激励兼容计划来实现
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1981
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Walker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lindahl Allocations;M. Walker
提出了一种关于公共产品生产和融资的政府决策的简单方案。该方案下的“竞争”均衡是帕累托最优的；更重要的是，它们是林达尔均衡。因此，拒绝参与从来不符合任何个人的利益(没有人在均衡时会比最初持有时更糟糕)；此外，在通常的经典公共产品经济中，均衡的存在是肯定的。直到最近，人们还认为，在公共产品存在的情况下确定帕累托最优配置的任何尝试，都会因为个人歪曲自己的偏好--可以说是“搭便车”--的动机而受挫。格罗夫斯和莱德亚德[2]颠覆了这一信念，他们引入了一种方法，将公共产品的生产和融资确定在帕累托最优水平，从而显然克服了搭便车问题。他们的计划由一个政府组成，该政府向消费者征求关于他们对各种公共产品的偏好的信息，并使用它收到的信息来确定(根据指定的规则)它对公共产品的购买以及将向消费者征收的税收，以资助这些购买。当这种政府“机制”与竞争市场(用于分配私人产品)结合使用时，当消费者遵循“类似竞争的”古诺行为来选择他们将传达给政府的信息时，所产生的均衡是帕累托最优的(然而，应该注意，有时并不存在均衡；见[3])。
A simple scheme for making governmental decisions about the production and financing of public goods is presented. The "competitive" equilibria under the scheme are Pareto optimal; more importantly, they are Lindahl equilibria. Thus, it is never in any individual's interest to refuse to participate (no one will be worse off at the equilibrium than at his initial holding); moreover, the existence of equilibria is assured in the usual classical public-goods economies. UNTIL RECENTLY, it was believed that any attempt to determine Pareto optimal allocations in the presence of public goods would be thwarted by individuals' incentives to misrepresent their preferences-to be "free riders," as it were. Groves and Ledyard [2] upset this belief when they introduced a method for determining the production and financing of public goods at Pareto optimal levels, thus apparently overcoming the free rider problem. Their scheme consists of a government which solicits information from consumers concerning their preferences for the various public goods, and which uses the information it receives to determine (according to specified rules) both its purchases of public goods and the taxes that will be levied on consumers to finance those purchases. When this governmental "mechanism" is employed in conjunction with competitive markets (for allocating private goods), and when consumers follow "competitive-like" Cournot behavior in choosing the information they will convey to the government, the resulting equilibria are Pareto optimal (it should be noted, however, that sometimes there is no equilibrium; see [3]).