From peacekeepers to praetorians – how participating in peacekeeping operations may subvert democracy
From peacekeepers to praetorians – how participating in peacekeeping operations may subvert democracy
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从维和人员到禁卫军——参与维和行动如何颠覆民主
DOI：
10.1177/0047117817740728
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Philip Cunliffe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Philip Cunliffe
本文提供了一个启发式研究的三个案例中，参与维和行动促使军事统治的维和部队派遣国。这三个非典型案例与牵制性和平理论相矛盾，该理论声称，为国外的维和行动做出贡献应该会刺激国内的民主。这三个国家的经验也使人们对将维持和平与自由民主体制、成果和做法紧密联系在一起的传统智慧产生了疑问。通过对文献、报告、精英访谈和维基解密电报的三角测量，对这些案件进行了审查，以确定更普遍的意见，即参与维和行动如何可能以牺牲派遣国的民主秩序和文官统治为代价加强军队的作用。牵制性和平理论被证明存在严重的概念缺陷。一些初步的努力是为了概括调查结果，加纳和乌拉圭被确定为拒绝进一步调查。一些变量被确定为提供概括的范围，即收入，领导和军事规模。还确定了几个有前途的领域，进一步研究：军事依赖维和可能使政治制度更容易渗透到外部影响，联合国（UN）在多大程度上可以在政治上影响其捐助国，以及如何建设和平可能会影响维和人员的理解，他们在自己的国家的作用。通过研究维和行动对维和人员派遣国的反馈影响，本文扭转了维和奖学金的传统重点，并有助于越来越多的文献研究更广泛的影响和意外后果的自由冲突管理。
This article provides a heuristic study of three cases where participation in peacekeeping operations prompted military rule in the peacekeeper-contributing state. These three atypical cases contradict the theory of diversionary peace, which claims that contributing to peacekeeping operations abroad should stimulate democracy at home. The experience of these three countries also calls into question the conventional wisdom that strongly associates peacekeeping with liberal democratic institutions, outcomes and practices. Via triangulation across literature, reports, elite interviews and WikiLeaks cables, these cases are examined in order to identify more generalisable observations regarding how participation in peacekeeping may enhance the role of the military at the expense of democratic order and civilian rule in the contributing state. The theory of diversionary peace is shown to suffer from serious conceptual flaws. Some preliminary efforts are made to generalise the findings, with Ghana and Uruguay identified as warranting further investigation. A number of variables are identified as offering scope for generalisation, namely, revenue, leadership and military size. Several promising areas for further research are also identified: how military dependence on peacekeeping may make political systems more permeable to outside influence, how far the United Nations (UN) can politically influence its contributor states and how peacebuilding may affect peacekeepers’ understanding of their role in their own countries. By examining the feedback effects of peacekeeping on peacekeeper-contributing states, the article reverses the conventional focus of peacekeeping scholarship and contributes to the growing literature examining the wider ramifications and unintended consequences of liberal conflict management.