The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?
The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?
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赫尔辛基协议：亚齐和平更有希望的基础？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Aspinall
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文献类型：
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作者：
E. Aspinall
首字母缩写词清单AMM亚齐监督团东盟东南亚国家联盟CMI危机管理倡议COHA停止敌对行动DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [人民代表理事会;印度尼西亚国民议会] GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [自由亚齐运动]印度尼西亚政府人道主义对话中心[以前，亨利·杜南中心谅解备忘录（MP-GAM Majelis Pemerintahan-GAM [GAM管理委员会] PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Demonsia-Perjuangan [印尼民主党-斗争党]）亚齐全民公决信息中心印度尼西亚国家军队联合国2005年1月，当印度尼西亚政府和自由亚齐运动（GAM）的代表宣布恢复和平谈判时，大多数评论家都持悲观态度。这一声明是在该地区冲突加剧之后宣布的，这一冲突始于早些时候的和平雅阁破裂和政府于2003年5月宣布"军事紧急状态"。2004年12月26日，印度洋海啸在亚齐造成大规模破坏和生命损失。对许多外部观察家来说，海啸是一次外部冲击，促使双方回到谈判桌上，但它似乎没有改变冲突的基本动态或交战双方之间的深仇大恨。在1月至7月的五轮艰难谈判中，这些悲观的预测似乎接近成真。有几次，这一进程似乎接近失败。事实上，这本专著认为，谅解备忘录是自近30年前叛乱开始以来谈判和平的最佳机会。部分原因是该协议的全面性。谅解备忘录规定了永久解决方案的大纲，包括关于亚齐政府、人权保护、安全事项、使前亚齐运动战斗人员重返社会的富有想象力的方法以及监测执行情况的强有力的第三方机制的规定。特别重要的是：通过同意该雅阁，GAM接受亚齐仍将是印度尼西亚的一部分。以下几页的分析主要不是通过提及印度洋海啸的影响，而是通过指出影响主要政党前景和组成的更深层次的动态来解释这一积极结果。关键因素是GAM的战斗疲劳加剧，这使得该运动的领导人更愿意考虑不独立的解决方案，以及印度尼西亚方面的政府更迭，这加强了那些致力于和平解决方案的人的立场。事实上，重开谈判的第一步在海啸发生之前就已迈出，海啸最好被视为为各方重返谈判、放弃长期立场提供了一个方便的借口。本研究分为几个部分。第一部分讨论了造成亚齐以前和平努力失败的因素。目的是评估赫尔辛基谅解备忘录是否成功地解决了过去导致暴力死灰复燃的问题。接下来的两个部分（“走向一个伤害Stallium？"和"重开谈判的第一步"）描述了恢复谈判的背景。他们指出了促使双方在上次失败后这么快就恢复谈判并使他们能够作出更大让步的关键因素。研究报告中间的四个部分（"谈判的开始"、"GAM的突破性提议"、"印尼方面的不团结"和"走向僵局"）调查了1月至7月的谈判过程。这些部分将按时间顺序叙述谈判情况，并对谈判立场、策略和各方、其支持者和盟友以及调解人的内部动态进行更具分析性的讨论。…
List of AcronymsAMM Aceh Monitoring MissionASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsCMI Crisis Management InitiativeCOHA Cessation of Hostilities AgreementDPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat [People's Representative Council; Indonesia's national parliament]GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement]GoI Government of IndonesiaHDC Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue [previously, the Henry Dunant Centre]MoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMP-GAM Majelis Pemerintahan-GAM [GAM Governing Council]PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan [Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle]SIRA Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh [Aceh Referendum Information Center]TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Military]UN United NationsWhen it was announced in January 2005 that representatives of the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) were resuming peace talks, most commentators were pessimistic. The announcement came after a period of intensified conflict in the territory that had begun with the breakdown of an earlier peace accord and the government's declaration of a "military emergency" in May 2003. It also followed the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, which caused massive destruction and loss of life in Aceh. To many outside observers, the tsunami was an external shock that pushed the two sides back to the negotiating table, but it did not appear to alter the fundamental dynamics of the conflict or the deep enmity between the belligerents. The somber predictions seemed close to coming true during the five rounds of tough bargaining between January and July. On several occasions the process seemed close to collapsing.1Nevertheless, the talks succeeded. Indeed, this monograph argues that the MoU represents the best chance for a negotiated peace since the insurgency began almost three decades ago. In part, this is because of the comprehensive nature of the agreement. The MoU sets down the outline of a permanent settlement and includes provisions on the government of Aceh, human rights protection, security matters, imaginative methods for reintegrating former GAM combatants into society, and a robust third-party mechanism for monitoring implementation. Especially important: by agreeing to the accord, GAM accepts that Aceh will remain part of Indonesia.The analysis presented in the following pages explains this positive outcome not primarily by reference to the impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami but by pointing to deeper dynamics affecting the outlook and composition of the chief parties. The key factors were mounting battle fatigue on the part of GAM, which made the movement's leaders more willing to contemplate solutions falling short of independence, and a change of government on the Indonesian side that strengthened the position of those committed to a peaceful solution. The first steps toward reopening talks were in fact taken before the tsunami, which is best viewed as providing a convenient pretext the parties used to return to talks and abandon long-held positions.The study is divided into several sections. The first discusses factors that caused the failure of previous peace efforts in Aceh. The aim is to allow for an evaluation of whether the Helsinki MoU successfully resolves problems that in the past have led to a return to violence. The next two sections ("Toward a Hurting Stalemate?" and "First Steps toward Reopening Negotiations") describe the background to the resumption of talks. They identify the key factors that prompted the two parties to return to negotiations so soon after the previous failure and enabled them to make bigger concessions. Four sections in the middle of the study ("Opening of Negotiations," "GAM's Breakthrough Offer," "Disunity on the Indonesian Side," and "Toward Deadlock") survey the course of the talks between January and July. These sections mix a chronological account of the negotiations with a more analytical discussion of the negotiating positions, tactics, and internal dynamics of the parties, their supporters and allies, and the mediator. …