Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
Are Regional Asymmetries Detrimental to Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.08.003
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发表时间：
2008-12
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Jun‐ichi Itaya;M. Okamura;Chikara Yamaguchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jun‐ichi Itaya;M. Okamura;Chikara Yamaguchi
本文重新考察了Cardarelli等人的主要发现[Cardarelli， R., Taugourdeau， E., Vidal, j . p .]。, 2002年。[j] .税收竞争的重复互动模型[j] .《公共经济理论》第4期，19-38。, 2006年。研究表明，在资本税收竞争的重复博弈模型中，区域不对称破坏了税收协调的隐性共谋。特别是，本文研究了人均资本禀赋和/或生产技术的区域差异增加如何影响每个地区在实现税收协调方面的合作意愿。研究表明，随着净资本输出头寸的区域不对称性增加，可能存在区域在资本税上的合作，从而实现税收协调的情况。
This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et al. [Cardarelli, R., Taugourdeau, E., Vidal, J.-P., 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax competition, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4, 19–38], and Catenaro and Vidal [Catenaro, M., Vidal, J.-P., 2006. Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 72, 1–17], who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition. In particular, this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination. It is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase, regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination.