Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002
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发表时间：
2008-07-01
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Tate, Geoffrey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Malmendier, Ulrike;Tate, Geoffrey
CEO过度自信有助于解释并购决策吗？过度自信的CEO高估了他们创造回报的能力。结果，他们为目标公司支付了过高的价格，并进行了破坏价值的并购。如果它们能够获得内部融资，则影响最大。我们用两个过度自信的替代品来检验这些预测：首席执行官个人对公司的过度投资和他们的媒体形象。我们发现，如果首席执行官被归类为过度自信，那么进行收购的几率会高出65%。如果合并是多样化的，而且不需要外部融资，则效果最大。市场对合并公告的反应（-90个基点）比非过度自信的CEO（-12个基点）更为负面。我们会考虑其他诠释，包括内幕消息、信号传递及风险承受能力。(C)2008 Elsevier B. V.保留所有权利。
Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs' personal over-investment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (-90 basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12 basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.