Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of CLEFIA
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of CLEFIA
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_25
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发表时间：
2008-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Y. Tsunoo;Etsuko Tsujihara;Maki Shigeri;Teruo Saito;Tomoyasu Suzaki;Hiroyasu Kubo
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文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Tsunoo;Etsuko Tsujihara;Maki Shigeri;Teruo Saito;Tomoyasu Suzaki;Hiroyasu Kubo
本文报道了2007年提出的128位分组密码CLEFIA的不可能差分密码分析，包括CLEFIA新的9轮不可能差分，以及使用它们进行不可能差分攻击的结果。对于128位密钥的情况，可以将不可能差分攻击应用于CLEFIA，减少到12轮。所需选择的明文数量为2118.9，时间复杂度为2119。对于192位和256位的密钥长度，可以对13轮和14轮CLEFIA应用不可能差分攻击。所需的选择明文数量分别为2119.8和2120.3，时间复杂度分别为2146和2212。这些不可能的差分攻击是攻击缩减轮CLEFIA的最强方法。
This paper reports impossible differential cryptanalysis on the 128-bit block cipher CLEFIA that was proposed in 2007, including new 9-round impossible differentials for CLEFIA, and the result of an impossible differential attack using them. For the case of a 128-bit key, it is possible to apply the impossible differential attack to CLEFIA reduced to 12 rounds. The number of chosen plaintexts required is 2118.9and the time complexity is 2119. For key lengths of 192 bits and 256 bits, it is possible to apply impossible differential attacks to 13-round and 14-round CLEFIA. The respective numbers of chosen plaintexts required are 2119.8and 2120.3and the respective time complexities are 2146and 2212. These impossible differential attacks are the strongest method for attacking reduced-round CLEFIA.