Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
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DOI：
10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0
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发表时间：
2007-10-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Noussair, Charles N.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Denant-Boemont, Laurent;Masclet, David;Noussair, Charles N.
我们提出了一个实验的结果，探讨了制裁行为的个人经历的社会困境。在我们研究的博弈中，参与者选择对公共产品的贡献水平，随后有多个机会减少群体中其他成员的收入。这些处理方法根据个人的机会而有所不同：（a）报复针对自己的制裁，（B）惩罚他人对第三方的制裁行为。我们发现，个人确实报复他们受到的制裁，这有助于降低贡献水平。它们还惩罚那些未能制裁第三方的国家，但由此产生的捐款增加额小于报复制裁所导致的捐款减少额。当存在五轮无限制制裁时，贡献和福利显著低于只有一轮制裁机会时，福利低于零合作基准。
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals' opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others' sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.