The General Lineage Concept of Species, Species Criteria, and the Process of Speciation
The General Lineage Concept of Species, Species Criteria, and the Process of Speciation
复制标题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Queiroz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Queiroz
物种形成，即新物种形成的过程，是进化生物学的中心主题之一。它连接了微观和宏观进化生物学的伟大领域，并交叉了各种相关的生物学学科，包括行为生物学、生态学、遗传学、形态学、古生物学、生理学、生殖生物学和系统学。因此，关于“物种”一词定义的持续争议似乎令人不安。新物种定义的不断提出——通常被描述为替代物种概念——似乎表明对于物种是什么还没有达成普遍共识，如果是这种情况，那么理解物种如何形成的可能性似乎也不太可能。至少，不同生物学家在谈论物种和物种形成时的含义似乎很可能会产生误解和混淆。但情况实际上并不像看起来那么麻烦。尽管真正的差异是替代物种定义的基础，但关于物种概念的分歧实际上比这么多替代定义的存在所表明的要少。每个物种的定义都有不同的侧重点，但它们所强调的各种现象都是单一种类实体的所有方面或属性。换句话说，几乎所有现代生物学家都具有相同的物种一般概念。这一一般概念的许多版本之间的差异至少部分归因于物种的复杂性和时间扩展性以及它们产生的一个或多个过程。在许多方面，将物种形成视为一个时间上延伸的过程是理解物种定义多样性的关键。在本章中，我提供了一个一般的理论背景，解释了替代物种定义所代表的思想的统一性和多样性。首先，我回顾了当代生物学家所采用的物种定义的主要类别。接下来，我提出的证据表明，所有现代物种定义都描述了物种的单一一般概念的变体。然后，我讨论物种的时间延伸性质和物种形成过程中发生的事件的多样性如何为替代物种定义的多样性提供基础。基于物种概念和物种标准之间的区别，我为当代物种定义所描述的思想提出了一个修订后的、概念上统一的术语，并讨论了不同类别物种定义的意义和局限性。最后，我研究了对物种标准的解释，该解释将替代标准置于直接冲突之中，从而包含了解决物种问题的关键。
Speciation, the process through which new species come into being, is one of the central topics of evolutionary biology. It links the great fields of microand macroevolutionary biology and intersects a wide variety of related biological disciplines, including behavioral biology, ecology, genetics, morphology, paleontology, physiology, reproductive biology, and systematics. For this reason, a persistent controversy regarding the definition of the term species may seem disconcerting. The continual proposal of new species definitions-commonly characterized as alternative species concepts-seems to suggest that there is no general agreement about what species are, and if this is the case, then the possibility of understanding how species come into being also seems unlikely. At the very least, there seems to be considerable potential for misinterpretation and confusion about what different biologists mean when they talk about species and speciation. But the situation is not really as troublesome as it may appear. Although real differences underlie alternative species definitions, there is really less disagreement about species concepts than the existence of so many alternative definitions seems to suggest. Each species definition has a different emphasis, but the various phenomena that they emphasize are all aspects or properties of a single kind of entity. In other words, almost all modem biologists have the same general concept of species. Differences among the many versions of this general concept are at least partly attributable to the complex and temporally extendednature of species and the process or processes through which they come into existence. In many respects, considering speciation as a temporally extended process is the key to understanding the diversity of species definitions. In this chapter, I provide a general theoretical context that accounts for both the unity and the diversity of ideas represented by alternative species definitions. First, I review the major categories of species definitions adopted by contemporary biologists. Next, I present evidence that all modem species definitions describe variants of a single general concept of species. I then discuss how the timeextended nature of species and the diversity of events that occur during the process of speciation provide the basis for the diversity of alternative species definitions. Based on a distinction between species concepts and species criteria, I propose a revised and conceptually unified terminology for the ideas described by contemporary species definitions, and I discuss the significance and limitations of different classes of species definitions. Finally, I examine an interpretation of species criteria that places alternative criteria in direct conflict and thus contains the key to resolving the species problem.