Government Intervention, Perceived Benefit, and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China
Government Intervention, Perceived Benefit, and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China
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DOI：
10.1007/s10551-011-0896-8
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发表时间：
2011-05
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Yongqiang Gao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yongqiang Gao
本文考察了(1)政府干预是否如寻租理论所认为的那样导致贿赂(或腐败)；(2)如理性选择/行为理论所说，企业的感知利益部分地调节了政府干预与其贿赂行为之间的关系；(3)其他企业的贿赂行为调节了政府干预与企业感知利益之间的关系。我们的研究表明，政府干预确实导致了贿赂/腐败，但它通过企业的感知利益对贿赂/腐败产生影响。换句话说，企业的感知利益完全调节了政府干预与其贿赂行为之间的关系。我们还发现，其他企业的贿赂行为正向缓和了政府干预与特定企业贿赂行为之间的关系。这项研究在一定程度上证明了企业是理性行为者。潜在的利益鼓励他们行贿。此外，本研究还支持贿赂/腐败的寻租观点，认为政府干预是贿赂/腐败的一个来源。然而，我们也发现，只有那些会造成“租金”的政府干预才会导致贿赂/腐败。
This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption.