Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads
Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1603916113
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发表时间：
2016-08-02
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Vavrek, Jayson R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kemp, R. Scott;Danagoulian, Areg;Vavrek, Jayson R.
如何在不透露有关核武器等高度敏感物体的信息的情况下证明有关该物体的说法？这一悖论对核军备控制提出了50多年的挑战。我们提出了一种机制，在一个互动的证明系统，可以验证的结构和组成的对象，如核弹头，以任意精度，而不透露其结构或组成的形式。我们介绍了一种层析成像方法，同时解决了一个对象的几何和同位素组成。我们还介绍了一种使用可证明安全的加密散列来保护信息的方法，该方法不依赖于电子设备或软件。这些技术与适当的协议相结合，构成了一个互动的证明系统，可以在相当短的测量时间内以出色的灵敏度拒绝恶作剧项目并清除真实弹头。
How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.