Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry
Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry
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专利费叠加和标准必要专利：来自世界移动无线行业的理论和证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2790347
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Gupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alexander Galetovic;K. Gupta
版税叠加假设是基于古诺互补模型。它指出，每个标准必要专利保持器（SEP保持器）单独设定的特许权使用费加起来可能会高得令人望而却步。本文建立了一个具有一般对数凹的恒定传递需求、下游寡头垄断和制造业内生进入的均衡模型。每个SEP保持器持有者独立设定线性版税，以最大化其个人利润。该模型表明，大约10个SEP持有人足以显着降低均衡输出，与100 SEP持有人输出几乎崩溃。随着SEP持有者数量的增加，（i）均衡价格上升;（ii）数量福尔斯下降;（iii）单个SEP持有者的版税和利润率下降;（iv）下游制造业集中。我们寻找世界移动的无线产业版税堆积的证据。广泛部署的2G、3G和4G无线蜂窝标准的SEP持有者数量从1994年的2个增长到2013年的130个。我们没有发现版税堆积的证据。1994年至2013年期间：（i）每年销售的器械数量增长了62倍或平均每年增长20：1%;（ii）控制技术世代，器械的真实的平均销售价格每年下降11：4%至24：8%;（iii）连续世代的初始平均销售价格随着时间的推移而下降;（iv）SEP持有者和非SEP持有者的平均毛利率均未显示任何趋势;（v）仪器制造商的数目由1家增至43家;（vi）自2001年起，集中程度下降，而同类制造商的数目由6家增至9家。
The royalty stacking hypothesis is based on the Cournot-complement model. It states that the royalties individually set by each standard essential patent holder (SEP holder) may add up to prohibitively high levels. We develop an equilibrium model with general log-concave constant-pass-through demand, downstream oligopoly and endogenous entry into manufacturing. Each SEP holder independently sets a linear royalty to maximize her individual profit. The model shows that roughly 10 SEP holders suffice to significantly reduce equilibrium output; with 100 SEP holders output nearly collapses. As the number of SEP holders increases (i) the equilibrium price rises; (ii) quantity falls (iii) individual SEP holders royalties and margins fall; and (iv) downstream manufacturing concentrates.We look for evidence of royalty stacking in the world mobile wireless industry. The number of SEP holders for the widely deployed 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless cellular standards protractedly grew from 2 in 1994 to 130 in 2013. We find no evidence of royalty stacking. Between 1994 and 2013: (i) the number of devices sold each year rose 62 times or 20:1% per year on average; (ii) controlling for technological generation, the real average selling price of a device fell between 11:4% and 24:8% per year (iii) the introductory average selling price of successive generations fell over time; (iv) neither the average gross margin of SEP holders nor of non-SEP holders shows any trend; (v) the number of device manufacturers grew from one to 43; (vi) since 2001, concentration fell and the number of equivalent manufacturers rose from six to nine.
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
"Preventive Instruments of Social Governance"
影响因子：
--
作者：
Fang Songying;Li Xiaojun;Tago Atsushi;Chiba Daina;Katsuyuki Wada;Masabumi Suzuki
通讯作者：
Masabumi Suzuki