Inside the welfare contract: Discretion and accountability in state welfare administration
Inside the welfare contract: Discretion and accountability in state welfare administration
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DOI：
10.1086/604228
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发表时间：
1997-03-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Brodkin, EZ
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brodkin, EZ
本文对芝加哥的就业机会和基本技能（JOBS）项目进行了详细的案例研究，强调了当州政府机构在管理围绕工作建立的福利合同时拥有自由裁量权时出现的问题。本研究观察到的日常运作揭示了官僚自由裁量权在赋予福利契约特定意义方面所起的作用。该研究还确定了影响国家福利机构如何在街头履行其政策义务的环境因素。它阐明了福利改革在资源有限和绩效问责制最低的条件下增加国家行政灵活性的风险。
This detailed case study of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program in Chicago highlights problems that arise when state agencies have discretion in administering a welfare contract built around work. The day-to-day operations observed in this study reveal the role bureaucratic discretion plays in giving specific meaning to the welfare contract. The study also identifies contextual factors that influence how state welfare agencies respond to their policy obligations at the street level. It illuminates the risks of welfare reforms that increase state administrative flexibility under conditions of limited resources and minimal accountability for performance.