Security analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems against stealthy deception attacks
Security analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems against stealthy deception attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/acc.2013.6580348
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发表时间：
2013-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Cheolhyeon Kwon;Weiyi Liu;Inseok Hwang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Cheolhyeon Kwon;Weiyi Liu;Inseok Hwang
网络物理系统（CPS）的安全性是一个重要而又具有挑战性的问题。由于大多数网络攻击都是以不稳定的方式发生的，因此很难系统地描述它们。在本文中，我们没有识别特定的网络攻击模型，而是重点分析系统在网络攻击期间的响应。通过篡改系统组件或数据执行的欺骗攻击（或虚假数据注入攻击）如果可以被系统的监视系统容易地检测到，则不需要特别关注。然而，聪明的网络攻击者可以通过精心设计的网络攻击来避免被监控系统检测到。我们的主要目标是从系统的角度来研究这种隐身欺骗攻击的性能。根据攻击者对系统的破坏能力，我们研究了三种隐身欺骗攻击。基于系统的动态信息和现有的假设检验算法，我们推导出攻击者可以执行各种攻击而不被发现的充分必要条件。最后，我们使用无人机（UAV）导航示例说明了这些网络攻击的威胁。
Security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber attacks is an important yet challenging problem. Since most cyber attacks happen in erratic ways, it is difficult to describe them systematically. In this paper, instead of identifying a specific cyber attack model, we are focused on analyzing the system's response during cyber attacks. Deception attacks (or false data injection attacks), which are performed by tampering with system components or data, are not of particular concern if they can be easily detected by the system's monitoring system. However, intelligent cyber attackers can avoid being detected by the monitoring system by carefully design cyber attacks. Our main objective is to investigate the performance of such stealthy deception attacks from the system's perspective. We investigate three kinds of stealthy deception attacks according to the attacker's ability to compromise the system. Based on the information about the dynamics of the system and existing hypothesis testing algorithms, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the attacker could perform each kind of attack without being detected. In the end, we illustrate the threat of these cyber attacks using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) navigation example.