Sovereign Defaults, Credit to the Private Sector, and Domestic Credit Market Institutions
Sovereign Defaults, Credit to the Private Sector, and Domestic Credit Market Institutions
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DOI：
10.1111/jmcb.12108
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发表时间：
2014-03-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Sandleris, Guido
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sandleris, Guido
主权违约与国内私营部门的国内外信贷下降有关。本文从理论上分析了主权违约是否会导致这种下降，即使国内代理人不持有主权债务。本文还研究了国内金融机构的质量是否会影响这种效应的大小。为了解决这些问题，本文嵌入了传统的主权债务文献中的主权借款人/外国债权人的关系，在一个宏观模型中，普遍存在的个人金融约束限制了一个国家重新分配资源的能力。本文发现，即使国内代理人不持有主权债务，主权违约也确实会导致国内外信用下降，而更强大的国内金融机构可以放大这种影响。这些发现为理解主权违约的成本迈出了新的一步。
Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in foreign and domestic credit to the domestic private sector. This paper analyzes theoretically whether sovereign defaults can lead to this decline, even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt. It also studies whether the quality of domestic financial institutions affect the magnitude of this effect. In order to address these issues, the paper embeds the traditional sovereign borrower/foreign creditors relationship of the sovereign debt literature in a macromodel where widespread individual financial constraints limit a country's ability to reallocate resources. The paper finds that sovereign defaults can indeed generate a decline in foreign and domestic credit even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt, and that stronger domestic financial institutions can amplify this effect. These findings constitute a new step toward understanding the costs of sovereign defaults.