Bayesian Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with mixed strategies
Bayesian Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with mixed strategies
复制标题
供水管网混合策略拦截的贝叶斯 Stackelberg 博弈模型
DOI：
10.1080/00207543.2020.1735661
复制
发表时间：
2020-03-24
影响因子：
9.2
通讯作者：
Liu, X.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang, J.;Liu, X.
我们解决了一个问题，防止阻断供水网络建立贝叶斯Stackelberg博弈模型涉及的利益相关者的防御者和拦截。防御者主动向网络各组成部分分配资源，在以水资源满足率衡量的网络弹性和防御者的成本之间进行权衡，而拦截者则以最大化网络结构的破坏程度和最小化拦截者的成本为目标拦截一个组成部分。具体而言，防御者采取混合防御策略，这意味着拦截者不确定防御者的资源分配。此外，我们提出了充分的条件，消除了占主导地位的防御和阻断策略。分别采用分解迭代学习算法（DILA）和基于最小深度二进制划分的分层算法（SBHA）来缩减防御策略集和拦截策略集的规模，从而分析最优混合防御策略。最后，本文通过一个真实的案例分析，对私人信息下的防卫者对抗封锁的资源配置提供了有价值的建议。
We address a problem of preventing an interdiction on water supply networks by building a Bayesian Stackelberg game model involving stakeholders of a defender and an interdictor. The defender initiates to allocate resource to network components to make a trade-off between network resilience measured by water satisfaction rate and the defender's cost, whereas the interdictor follows to interdict a component with the objectives of maximising the destruction level on the network structure and minimising the interdictor's cost. Specifically, the defender adopts mixed defence strategies, which implies that the interdictor is uncertain of the defender's resource allocation. Moreover, we propose sufficient conditions for the elimination of the dominated defence and interdiction strategies. A decomposed iterative learning algorithm (DILA) and a smallest-depth binary-partition based hierarchical algorithm (SBHA) are developed to reduce the sizes of the defence and interdiction strategy sets, respectively, thus analysing the optimal mixed defence strategies. Finally, a real case study with private information is conducted, thus providing valuable suggestions for the defender's resource allocation against interdictions.