Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination
Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination
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轻契约和债权人协调
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
V. Ivashina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bo Becker;V. Ivashina
2015年，70%的新发行杠杆贷款具有较弱的执行特征，称为“轻担保”或“轻担保”;与2007年的上一个峰值相比，这几乎是轻担保发行量的三倍。我们评估这种发展是否可以归因于市场过热，借款人对低门槛贷款的需求增加，或债权人协调成本的上升。最后一个假设源于非银行机构越来越多的参与，特别是金融危机后共同基金参与杠杆贷款市场的增加。基于非银行机构贷款人的更广泛的联合、（更狭窄的）技能和多样化的激励，它们与企业借款人之间的最优合同可能涉及更少的监督工具和更弱的控制权。我们在2001-2014年期间的美国贷款大样本中评估了这些对低门槛合同条款的解释。与债权人驱动的解释为低冠发行一致，我们表明，低冠价格压缩作为低冠的流行上升。低门槛债券发行的时间模式与机构贷款人的资金流入密切匹配，在特定时间，低门槛债券贷款绝大多数是结构性产品和/或共同基金拥有最高所有权的债券。结构性产品和共同基金的数量和份额也会影响对其他合同特征的倾向，这些特征会影响债权人何时以及如何拥有控制权。然而，这些因素在解释对债务、留置权、付款或资产出售的限制力度方面不太相关。
In 2015, 70% of newly-issued leveraged loans had weaker enforcement features, called covenant-light or “cov-lite;” this is nearly a three-time increase in cov-lite issuance compared to a previous peak in 2007. We evaluate whether this development can be attributed to market overheating, increased borrower demand for cov-lite loans, or a rise in creditor coordination costs. The last hypothesis stems from the increasing involvement of non-bank institutions and, in particular, the rise of mutual fund participation in the leveraged loan market after the financial crisis. Based on the wider syndication, (narrower) skills, and diverse incentives of non-bank institutional lenders, optimal contracts between them and corporate borrowers likely involve fewer monitoring tools and weaker control rights. We evaluate these explanations of cov-lite contract provisions in a large sample of U.S. loans for the 2001–2014 period. Consistent with creditor-driven explanations for cov-lite issuance, we show that cov-lite prices compress as the prevalence of cov-lite rises. Time patterns in cov-lite issuance closely match inflows to institutional lenders, and at a given time, cov-lite loans are, overwhelmingly, those with the highest ownership by structured products and/or mutual funds. The number and share of structured products and mutual funds also impact the propensity toward other contractual features that influence when and how creditors have control. However, these factors are less relevant in explaining the strength of restrictions on indebtedness, liens, payments, or assets sales.