Is There a Violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game?
Is There a Violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game?
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DOI：
10.1177/1059712310366040
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发表时间：
2010-06
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Shu Li;Zuo-Jun Wang;L. Rao;Yan-Mei Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shu Li;Zuo-Jun Wang;L. Rao;Yan-Mei Li
这份报告试图确定违反萨维奇的确定性原则是否足够强大，足以在囚犯困境游戏的原始回报领域生存下来。研究发现，正如Shafir和Tversky所期望的那样，在收益领域违反了确定性原则，但在损失领域遵守了确定性原则。进一步发现，在最初的刑期赔付中也遵守了确定性原则，属于损失领域。这些发现建议重新审视确定性原则在囚徒困境游戏中的应用。
This report seeks to determine whether the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle is robust enough to survive in an original payoff domain of the prisoner’s dilemma game. It was found that the sure-thing principle was violated in the domain of gains as expected by Shafir and Tversky but obeyed in the domain of losses. It was further found that the sure-thing principle was also obeyed in the original prison sentence payoffs, which fall into the domain of losses. The findings suggest a reexamination of the application of the sure-thing principle in the prisoner’s dilemma game.