Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
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DOI：
10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7
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发表时间：
2019-02-15
影响因子：
16.6
通讯作者：
Milinski, Manfred
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Becks, Lutz;Milinski, Manfred
预测重复的社会互动的合作策略。最近描述的零决定因素（ZD）策略执行合作伙伴的合作，因为“慷慨的”ZD球员帮助他们的合作伙伴，而“勒索”ZD球员利用他们的合作伙伴的合作。合伙人可能会同意勒索，因为这样做会给他们带来好处，但合伙人可以通过背叛来惩罚勒索者，从而破坏自己和勒索者的分数。因此，预计敲诈勒索将变成慷慨和消失。在这里，我们与人类志愿者表明，一个额外的金钱激励（奖金）支付给最后的竞争力上级球员保持勒索。出乎意料的是，勒索者拒绝遵守纪律，从而迫使合作伙伴同意。偶尔的反对减少了勒索者的收益，所以使用勒索只因为奖金而得到回报。在没有奖金激励的情况下，玩家使用慷慨的ZD策略。我们的研究结果表明，当更高的竞争力得到额外的回报时，勒索策略可以占上风。
Cooperative strategies are predicted for repeated social interactions. The recently described Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies enforce the partner's cooperation because the 'generous' ZD players help their cooperative partners while 'extortionate' ZD players exploit their partners' cooperation. Partners may accede to extortion because it pays them to do so, but the partner can sabotage his own and his extortioner's score by defecting to discipline the extortioner. Thus, extortion is predicted to turn into generous and disappear. Here, we show with human volunteers that an additional monetary incentive (bonus) paid to the finally competitively superior player maintains extortion. Unexpectedly, extortioners refused to become disciplined, thus forcing partners to accede. Occasional opposition reduced the extortioners' gain so that using extortion paid off only because of the bonus. With no bonus incentive, players used the generous ZD strategy. Our findings suggest that extortion strategies can prevail when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain.