Informational aspects in a class of Bayesian congestion games
Informational aspects in a class of Bayesian congestion games
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一类贝叶斯拥塞博弈中的信息方面
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
Saurabh Amin
中科院分区：
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作者：
Manxi Wu;Jeffrey Liu;Saurabh Amin
我们研究了贝叶斯拥塞博弈模型路由的环境中，路由成本的随机网络状态的影响。每个玩家都订阅了两个旅行者信息系统（TIS）中的一个，该系统以不同的准确度估计状态。TISs诱导两个旅行者群体的异质访问信息的状态。然后，每个旅行者群体根据其对国家和其他群体的私人信念，在两条平行路线的网络上路由其需求。为了简单起见，我们假设一个TIS在所有状态下提供比另一个更准确的估计。我们刻画了两种信息结构下的博弈均衡。第一信息结构由客观信念指定，即，那些与网络状态和类型简档上的公共先验分布一致，而第二种由不承认公共先验的主观信念指定。我们的均衡结果允许分析的社会成本相对于两个人口的相对规模的变化。我们表明，无论是一个独特的人口规模的比例，或人口规模的连续范围内的均衡社会成本最小化，信息访问的异质性总是对社会有益的。然而，这一比例（或范围）的人口规模不同的主观和客观的情况。最后，我们研究的信息结构的例子，在人口中的旅行者获得更准确的信息的状态比其他旅行者更糟糕。
We study a Bayesian congestion game which models routing in environments where the route costs are affected by a random network state. Each player is subscribed to one of two Traveler Information Systems (TIS), which estimate the state with different levels of accuracy. The TISs induce two traveler populations with heterogeneous access to information about the state. Each traveler population then routes its demand on a network of two parallel routes based on its private beliefs of the state and of the other population. For simplicity, we assume that one TIS provides a more accurate estimate than the other in all states. We characterize the equilibria of the game under two information structures. The first information structure is specified by objective beliefs, i.e., those consistent with a common prior distribution on the network state and type profiles, whereas the second is specified by subjective beliefs that do not admit a common prior. Our equilibrium results permit an analysis of social costs with respect to changes in the relative size of two populations. We show that the equilibrium social cost is minimized either for a unique ratio of population sizes, or for a continuous range of population sizes, and that information access heterogeneity is always socially beneficial. However, this ratio (or range) of population sizes differ between the subjective and objective cases. Finally, we study examples of information structures in which travelers in the population with access to more accurate information about the state are worse off than the other travelers.