The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties
The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties
复制标题
风险投资解决公司股东信托义务封闭问题
DOI：
10.2307/1373186
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Shannon Wells Stevenson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shannon Wells Stevenson
在过去的半个世纪里，法院和立法机构都试图解决封闭公司中股东关系所带来的独特问题。最初，适用于公共公司的法律也适用于封闭公司。然而，由于封闭式公司和公共公司之间存在若干重大差异，公共公司法的这种适用往往产生不公平的结果。作为回应，法院开始对公司的亲密股东的问题制定公平的解决方案，给予他们更大的合同自由、解散和收购权利，并加强了受托责任。各国在不同程度上将这种独特的待遇编纂成法律，许多国家采用了管理封闭公司的特别法典章节。
Over the past half century, both courts and legislatures have attempted to address the unique problems posed by shareholder relations in close corporations. Initially, the same law that governed public corporations also governed close corporations. Because of several significant differences between close and public corporations, however, this application of public corporation law frequently produced inequitable results. In response, courts began to fashion equitable solutions to the problems of close corporation shareholders, giving them greater freedom of contract, dissolution and buyout rights, and enhanced fiduciary duties. States have codified this unique treatment to varying degrees, and many have adopted special code sections governing close corporations.