Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design
Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design
复制标题
先验无关的多参数机构设计
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_11
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
11.4
通讯作者：
C. T. Nguyen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nikhil R. Devanur;Jason D. Hartline;Anna R. Karlin;C. T. Nguyen
在单位需求的多单元多项目拍卖中，拍卖师将不同物品的集合出售给一组有兴趣购买单位的代理商。每个代理对于每个项目都有不同的私人价值。我们考虑了设计真实拍卖的问题，该拍卖在这种情况下最大化拍卖师的利润。以前，在从已知的先前分布中得出每个值的环境中，此问题已经取得了进展。具体而言，已显示如何设计为这些先验量身定制的拍卖，以实现恒定因子近似比[2，5]。在本文中，我们为此设置提供了与此设置的先前无关的拍卖。保证这次拍卖可以达到一类所谓的“常规”分布的最佳预期利润的恒定部分，而没有特定的分布知识。
In a unit-demand multi-unit multi-item auction, an auctioneer is selling a collection of different items to a set of agents each interested in buying at most unit. Each agent has a different private value for each of the items. We consider the problem of designing a truthful auction that maximizes the auctioneer's profit in this setting. Previously, there has been progress on this problem in the setting in which each value is drawn from a known prior distribution. Specifically, it has been shown how to design auctions tailored to these priors that achieve a constant factor approximation ratio [2, 5]. In this paper, we present a prior-independent auction for this setting. This auction is guaranteed to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal expected profit for a large class of, so called, "regular" distributions, without specific knowledge of the distributions.