Confidence-accuracy inversions in scene recognition: A remember-know analysis
Confidence-accuracy inversions in scene recognition: A remember-know analysis
复制标题
DOI：
10.1037/0278-7393.24.5.1306
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发表时间：
1998-09-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Liu, Q
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dobbins, IG;Kroll, NEA;Liu, Q
S. E. Clark（1997）对E. Tulving（1981）的实验。除了复制E. Tulving，（1981），我们让参与者做出“记忆熟悉”的判断。主观报告的置信度和准确性不相关。反应的信心不同，只有基于熟悉的判断，而准确性不同，只有“记住”的反应。S. E.克拉克的模型没有预测到这一点，也不能在所有条件下模拟“记忆”表现。我们建议，虽然“知道”可以容纳在一个等方差信号检测帐户，“记住”是由上下文的限制，影响参与者在报告中依赖的信息的独特性。目前的范例是一个图形类似H。L. Roediger和K. B。McDermott的范式（1995年），参与者声称明确记住了在学习过程中实际上没有看到的主题相关项目。
S. E. Clark (1997) offered a modified signal-detection explanation of the confidence-accuracy inversions observed in E. Tulving's (1981) experiments. In addition to replicating E. Tulving, (1981), we had participants make "remember-familiar'' judgments. Confidence and accuracy dissociated across subjective reports. Response confidence differed only for judgments based on familiarity, whereas accuracy differed only for "remember" responses. S. E. Clark's model does not predict this, nor can it mimic "remember" performance across all conditions. We propose that although "knowing" can be accommodated within an equal variance signal-detection account, "remembering" is governed by contextual constraints that influence the distinctiveness of information upon which participants rely during reports. The current paradigm is a pictorial analogue to H. L. Roediger and K. B. McDermott's paradigm (1995) in that participants claim to explicitly remember thematically related items that were not actually seen during study.