Credit, Wages, and Bankruptcy Laws Our Analysis of Bankruptcy Has Benefited from Discussions With
Credit, Wages, and Bankruptcy Laws Our Analysis of Bankruptcy Has Benefited from Discussions With
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信用、工资和破产法 我们对破产的分析得益于与以下人士的讨论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Luigi Zingales
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Thomas Mariotti;Alberto Bennardo;Patrick Bolton;Catherine Casamatta;Georges Casamatta;Denis Gromb;Roman Inderst;Steven Kaplan;N. Kiyotaki;J. Laffont;D. Martimort;Marco Pagano;Fausto Panunzi;Howard Rosenthal;Gilles Saint;Klaus Schmidt;A. Shleifer;J. Tirole;Luigi Zingales
我们研究破产法对一般均衡的影响，同时考虑信贷与劳动力市场之间的相互作用以及财富异质性。软破产法通常禁止清算，以避免事后效率低下。这加剧了信贷配给，抑制了投资并降低了总杠杆率。然而，严厉的法律并不一定能最大限度地提高社会福利，也不一定能从立法过程中产生。相对富裕的代理人可以不受法律约束地进行投资，他们青睐软法律，将较贫穷的企业家排除在信贷市场之外，从而减少劳动力需求和工资。这提高了仍然可以筹集资金的企业家的可抵押收入，从而降低了他们的清算率和相关的低效率。因此，软法可以使社会福利最大化。最后，从福利主义的角度来看，软破产法可能是比投资补贴更有效的工具。
We study the impact of bankruptcy laws in general equilibrium, taking into account the interactions between the credit and the labor markets, as well as wealth heterogeneity. Soft bankruptcy laws often preclude liquidation in order to avoid ex-post inefficiencies. This worsens credit rationing, depresses investment and reduces aggregate leverage. Yet, tough laws do not necessarily maximize social welfare or emerge from the legislative process. Relatively rich agents, who can invest irrespective of the law, favor soft laws which exclude poorer entrepreneurs from the credit market and thus reduce labor demand and wages. This raises the pledgeable income of the entrepreneurs who can still raise funds, and thus lowers their liquidation rates and the associated inefficiencies. Hence, a soft law can maximize social welfare. Last, a soft bankruptcy law may be a more effective instrument than investment subsidies from a welfarist point of view.