Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice: The Cournot‐Bertrand Model
Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice: The Cournot‐Bertrand Model
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00411.x
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发表时间：
2013-10
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Victor J. Tremblay;C. Tremblay;Kosin Isariyawongse
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文献类型：
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作者：
Victor J. Tremblay;C. Tremblay;Kosin Isariyawongse
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.
