Rejection of Smooth GPS Time Synchronization Attacks via Sparse Techniques
Rejection of Smooth GPS Time Synchronization Attacks via Sparse Techniques
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DOI：
10.1109/jsen.2020.3014239
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发表时间：
2021-01-01
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Akopian, David
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Schmidt, Erick;Lee, Junhwan;Akopian, David
本文提出了一种新的全球定位系统（GPS）的时间同步攻击（TSA）模型的基础上的时钟数据的行为变化的高阶导数域。进一步提出了基于稀疏域的TSA抑制和抑制算法。在需要精确定时的应用中，如蜂窝通信、金融交易和电网监控，TSA会影响固定GPS接收机。在目前的工作中，高阶导数的时钟偏置和时钟漂移进行监测，以揭示TSAs显示为稀疏的尖峰状事件。攻击的平滑性与观察到稀疏性的导数阶数有关。所提出的方法联合估计GPS定时的动态解决方案，并拒绝基于这样的稀疏事件的时钟行为变化。一个评估程序，提出了两个测试平台，即商业接收机和软件定义无线电（SDR）。此外，所提出的方法进行评估，对真实的欺骗的情况下，可在线在得克萨斯州欺骗测试电池（TEXBAT）。综合合成和实际数据的结果显示，SDR平台的平均RMS时钟偏置误差为12.08 m，商业设备的平均RMS时钟偏置误差为45.74 m。此外，该技术的评估对国家的最先进的缓解技术，并在欺骗加多路径的情况下的鲁棒性。最后，TSARM-S可以通过固件升级在商业设备中进行优化和实现。
This article presents a novel time synchronization attack (TSA) model for the Global Positioning System (GPS) based on clock data behavior changes in a higher-order derivative domain. Further, TSA rejection and mitigation based on sparse domain (TSARM-S) is presented. TSAs affect stationary GPS receivers in applications where precise timing is required, such as cellular communications, financial transactions, and monitoring of the electric power grid. In the present work, higher-order derivatives of the clock bias and clock drift are monitored to reveal TSAs that show up as sparse spike-like events. The smoothness of the attack relates to the derivative order where the sparsity is observed. The proposed method jointly estimates a dynamic solution for GPS timing and rejects clock behavior changes based on such sparse events. An evaluation procedure is presented for two testbeds, namely a commercial receiver and a software-defined radio (SDR). Further, the proposed method is evaluated against real spoofing scenarios available online in the Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT). Combined synthetic and real-data results show an average RMS clock bias error of 12.08 m for the SDR platform, and 45.74 m for the commercial device. Furthermore, the technique is evaluated against state-of-the-art mitigation techniques and in a spoofing-plus-multipath scenario for robustness. Finally, TSARM-S can be potentially optimized and implemented in commercial devices via a firmware upgrade.