Research on the Differentiated Impact Mechanism of Parent Company Shareholding and Managerial Ownership on Subsidiary Responsive Innovation: Empirical Analysis Based on ‘Principal–Agent’ Framework
Research on the Differentiated Impact Mechanism of Parent Company Shareholding and Managerial Ownership on Subsidiary Responsive Innovation: Empirical Analysis Based on ‘Principal–Agent’ Framework
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DOI：
10.3390/su11195252
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发表时间：
2019-09
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Peng Xu;Heng Zhang;Guiyu Bai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Peng Xu;Heng Zhang;Guiyu Bai
在动态竞争态势下，企业之间的创新竞争互动将采取相互响应的形式，而响应性创新战略的制定和实施将受到委托代理关系中股东和管理者双方的影响。本文的研究试图了解股东与管理者之间的治理逻辑差异如何影响企业的创新互动策略。为了实现这一研究目标，本研究以中国证券市场上所有符合条件的上市公司（2007年至2016年）为样本。研究结果表明，母公司持股比例对子公司响应式创新有负向影响，而管理层持股比例高的公司则选择相对积极的战略响应式创新。所有权与控制权的分离程度和外部制度环境对上述关系具有调节作用。相关结论可为上市公司响应性创新决策的制定提供一定的参考价值，并为企业集团治理背景下的母子公司治理结构设计和管理层股权激励机制设计提供新的思路。
Under the dynamic competition situation, the innovation competition interaction between enterprises will take the form of mutual responding, while the formulation and implementation of responsive innovation strategy will be influenced by both shareholders and managers in the principal–agent relationship. In our research, we try to understand how the difference of governance logic between shareholders and managers affects innovation interaction strategy of enterprises. In order to achieve this research goal, this study takes all eligible listed companies (from 2007 to 2016) in China’s stock market as samples. The results show that the parent company shareholding has a negative impact on the subsidiary responsive innovation, while companies whose managers hold more shares select the relatively positive strategy responsive innovation. Moreover, the degree of separation between ownership and control rights and the external institutional environment can moderate the above relationship. Relevant conclusions can provide some reference value for the formulation of responsive innovation decision of listed companies and provide new insights for the design of parent–subsidiary corporate governance structure and the design of managerial equity incentive mechanism in the context of corporate group governance.