Sequential Mergers and Competition Policy under Partial Privatisation
Sequential Mergers and Competition Policy under Partial Privatisation
复制标题
部分私有化下的相继合并与竞争政策
DOI：
10.1111/1467-8454.12159
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Daisuke Shimizu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takeshi Ebina;Daisuke Shimizu
我们研究了在一个部分私有化的寡头垄断的差异化产品的最优合并和私有化政策。我们首先证明，在子博弈完美纳什均衡下，顺序合并要么完全出现，要么根本不出现。鉴于这一结果，我们得出以下政策含义。第一，社会福利水平与企业对合并的数量呈U型关系。也就是说，鉴于已经发生了一些合并，进一步合并实际上可能导致福利改善。然而，这些改善福利的合并可能不会为私人带来利润，这意味着合并友好政策是适当的。其次，政策制定者可以停止私有化，以减少私人对进一步连续（福利恶化）合并的激励，并改善福利。第三，除非商品是同质的或独立的，否则完全国有化从来都不是最优的。我们的研究结果适用于日本人寿保险业和日本邮政保险的部分私有化。
We examine optimal merger and privatisation policies in a partially privatised oligopoly with differentiated goods. We first show that under the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, sequential mergers either emerge completely or do not emerge at all. Given this outcome, we derive the following policy implications. First, the level of social welfare can be U‐shaped with respect to the number of merged firm pairs. That is, given that there are some mergers that have already taken place, further mergers may actually lead to welfare improvement. However, these welfare‐improving mergers may not be privately profitable, implying that merger‐friendly policies are appropriate. Second, policymakers can halt privatisation in order to diminish the private incentive for further sequential (welfare‐deteriorating) mergers and improve welfare. Third, full nationalisation is never optimal unless the goods are homogeneous or independent. Our results are applicable to the Japanese life insurance industry and the partial privatisation of Japan Post Insurance.