Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock
复制标题
僵局的制度和党派根源
DOI：
10.1177/0951692896008001002
复制
发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Keith. Krehbiel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keith. Krehbiel
A spatial theory of the comparative consequences of unified and divided government clarifies the relationship between institutions, partisanship and gridlock. Under formally specified conditions, executive and legislative institutions are shown to inhibit but not prohibit the convergence of public policies to those most preferred by the legislative median voter. Extensions illustrate the theoretical robustness of the primary empirical expectation. Under all but extreme conditions, gridlock is a predictable consequence of super-majoritarian procedures. Gridlock occurs in divided and unified government alike, and in the presence of any degree of party strength. Concluding discussions speculate on the effects of alternative assumptions and on applications of the theoretical framework to settings other than US national government.
